The upcoming election of judges will increase the backlog of cases in the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.
- The recent approval of General Agreement 3/2025 (the "Agreement") by the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation establishes the basis for the conclusion of its current functions and regulates the session schedule that will govern until August 2025.
- This process is occurring in parallel with the implementation of the constitutional reform published on September 15, 2024 ("Constitutional Reform of the Judiciary"), which structurally transformed the Court, reducing the number of justices from 11 to 9, eliminating its Chambers, and establishing the Plenary as the sole decision-making body.
- In this regard, we believe that while the Agreement is a significant step in the institutional transition process stemming from the reform of the Judiciary, as it seeks to ensure the continuity, transparency, and orderly conclusion of the High Court's work, the combination of various factors provided for in the Constitutional Reform of the Judiciary will result in a significant increase in the backlog of cases, which represents a significant challenge for guaranteeing the right to prompt and expeditious justice.
In this regard, the Agreement establishes a progressive agenda for the completion of the functions of the current Supreme Court. In operational terms, during the months of April to July 2025, no new cases will be referred to the current justices, except for those considered urgent or priority, and a reduction in the frequency of Plenary and Chamber sessions will be maintained. It should be remembered that once a case reaches the Supreme Court, a lottery is held to determine which justice will be assigned (which shift) to carry out the initial study of the case and prepare the draft judgment, which, in due course, must be analyzed and voted on by the other justices for the corresponding judgment to be issued.
In this regard, and while this design seeks to address the growing backlog and pending procedures, it is inevitable to anticipate that this procedural pause will increase the backlog of matters that will need to be addressed by the new composition of the Plenary starting September 1, 2025, since the new ministers will have to resolve not only the new cases that are presented, but also all those that reach the court in these four months.
This backlog takes on an even more complex dimension when considering the new applicable constitutional framework. In particular, the Constitutional Reform to the Judiciary introduced a substantial change to Article 17 of the Constitution, establishing that the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation must resolve tax matters within a maximum period of six months, starting from the date the matter is brought before the competent authority.
This new parameter poses important operational and legal implications, as it requires a clear definition of when the calculation of this period begins. In this regard, reasonable doubts arise regarding its interpretation:
- Should the deadline be counted from the moment the matter is formally submitted to the Court, even if it has not been referred?
- Or does the deadline begin once the new member of the Plenary takes office and actually hears the case?
Both interpretations entail significant risks. In the first scenario, various cases currently pending or on hold could exceed the constitutional deadline of six months, raising questions about the procedural validity of their resolution. In the second, the backlog of pending cases, coupled with the elimination of the Chambers and the reduction from eleven to nine members of the Plenary, could compromise the quality of the rulings by further concentrating the workload on each minister.
From a literal interpretation of the constitutional text, it could be argued that the deadline has already begun to run for those cases that have formally entered the Court, even if they have not been referred, which would place us before the imminent realization of the failure to comply with the established deadline. If the opposite interpretation is upheld—that is, that the calculation begins once the new Plenary Session materially hears the cases—an express resolution from the competent body clarifying this point would be essential. Otherwise, the justices would be exposed to potential liability proceedings before the new Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, in accordance with the current legal framework.
In addition to the above, the complex integration process that the new judges, elected through mechanisms unprecedented in our constitutional system, will face must be considered. Beyond the procedural aspects, this process will entail a substantial change in profiles, in the way the Constitution is interpreted, and, in general, in the judicial culture that will govern from this new integration. Added to this is the challenge of joining a judicial body without Chambers, which will deliberate and rule solely in plenary session, which will profoundly alter the internal working dynamics, the pace of decision-making, and the deliberation times.
From our perspective, the institutional challenge is not limited to formal compliance with constitutional deadlines. The real challenge will be ensuring that the rulings issued by the new Supreme Court maintain the quality, argumentative depth, and technical soundness that characterize the country's highest judicial authority. The Court not only interprets the Constitution but also charts the course of the national legal system. Therefore, any impact on the quality of its rulings would have a direct impact on legal certainty, the unity of the constitutional order, and the effective protection of human rights.
In this context, we believe that the Supreme Court will face an institutional breaking point. The reduction in its membership, the elimination of the Chambers, the incorporation of new positions, and the accumulated procedural backlog represent factors that, if not addressed with strategy, transparency, and technical rigor, could affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of the High Court. Balancing the demand for promptness with the need to issue technically impeccable judgments will be a complex but essential task. Achieving this balance will not only be key to preserving public confidence in the Judiciary, but also to ensuring, in practice and not just in rhetoric, that access to justice in Mexico is truly expeditious, complete, and impartial, as required by our Constitution.











