The consequences of the Judicial Reform in Mexico: analysis and implications of a new judicial reform initiative

The constitutional reform concerning the Judiciary, published on September 15, 2024, constituted a genuine paradigm shift by introducing a system of popular election for judges. However, the haste with which the new model was implemented revealed several regulatory and operational inconsistencies, as well as numerous areas for improvement that prevented the full achievement of the originally intended objectives.

In particular, the mass selection of judges strained the mechanisms for reviewing and evaluating candidates, making it difficult to conduct a thorough and rigorous assessment of their suitability. The scale of the process and the tight deadlines under which it was carried out limited the institutional capacity to effectively verify compliance with the standards required for the exercise of judicial functions.

In this context, on April 21, 2026, a proposed constitutional reform was published in the Parliamentary Gazette of the Chamber of Deputies. This reform proposes modifications to various provisions related to the organization, operation, and selection process for judges. The central purpose of this initiative is to correct the deficiencies identified in the implementation of the current model and to strengthen its institutional elements. This article addresses the main proposed modifications and the potential implications of this initiative.

a) Single Evaluation Committee

One of the most significant changes involves replacing the current system, which is based on three Evaluation Committees –one for each branch of government—by a Single Evaluation Committee composed of nine people. This body would centralize the receipt and analysis of applicants' files, as well as the verification of compliance with constitutional and legal requirements, with the objective of identifying the best-qualified candidates for judicial positions. The measure seeks to standardize evaluation criteria and reduce the inconsistency in the assessment of candidates.

b) Assessment requirements

Regarding eligibility requirements, the initiative proposes a substantial change. While the current model introduced elements of a formal and, to some extent, subjective nature –such as specific academic averages, letters of reference, or motivational essaysThe new proposal incorporates, as an essential constitutional requirement, the accreditation of a current competency certification issued by the National School of Judicial Training. This adjustment aims to establish an objective and standardized parameter for evaluating the technical skills of applicants, such as legal reasoning, normative interpretation, and the application of human rights criteria.

Additionally, for ministers and judges, the requirement for professional experience in the practice of law is strengthened, giving greater weight to career paths within the judiciary or in the legal field in general. This change represents a shift from the current model, by once again prioritizing practical experience as the central element for access to judicial positions.

c) Leading role of the National Electoral Institute

Another relevant aspect is the reconfiguration of the role of the authorities involved in the judicial electoral process. The 2024 reform granted the Senate an initial role in issuing the call for applications and receiving nominations. The new initiative proposes excluding the Senate from this stage, transferring the power to directly issue the call for applications to the National Electoral Institute (INE). The Single Evaluation Committee would then be responsible for receiving and reviewing the candidates' files, forwarding only the highest-scoring applicants to the INE. This aims to simplify the procedure and provide greater institutional coherence to the process.

d) Integration of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation

Regarding the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, the initiative proposes the possibility of it functioning not only in plenary session, but also through “Sections” –a figure that, in fact, resumes the logic of the previous Chambers-, with the aim of handling the workload more efficiently and allowing for greater specialization in resolving issues.

e) Impediments to aspiring to a jurisdictional position

Likewise, the list of impediments to aspiring to jurisdictional positions is expanded, incorporating various local public servants –as heads of state secretariats, local deputations, councils and municipal authorities—, as well as individuals with recent ties to political parties, including membership or holding leadership or representative positions. This measure aims to reinforce the perception of impartiality and judicial independence by distancing candidates from those with immediate political experience.

f) Harmonization of local judicial powers

Furthermore, the initiative contemplates the harmonization of the model at the local level, establishing that the Judicial Powers of the federal entities must adopt equivalent requirements, particularly in relation to the certification of competencies issued by the National School of Judicial Training, which points towards the construction of uniform standards throughout the country.

Finally, one particular adjustment involves decoupling the selection of judges from the regular federal electoral calendar. In this regard, it is proposed that judicial electoral processes have their own independent calendar, and that the next election, scheduled for 2027, be postponed to 2028, in order to allow sufficient time to properly design and implement the technical certification system.

In conclusion, the reform initiative seeks to address the main shortcomings identified in the current model, particularly those related to subjectivity in the evaluation of candidates and the inadequacy of technical mechanisms to guarantee the suitability of judges. From an impartial perspective, the incorporation of competency certification as a constitutional requirement is probably the most significant change, as it directly addresses the central criticism of the original system. However, its effectiveness will depend largely on the design, transparency, and rigor of the guidelines adopted by the National School of Judicial Training.

Similarly, strengthening professional experience requirements could help ensure that elected officials have a solid track record and practical knowledge of the judicial function. In this case, this would imply a revaluation of the judicial career and a possible reduction in the pool of applicants, favoring more specialized profiles. How this balance is achieved will be crucial in evaluating the model's success in the coming years.