Guarantee for the suspension in direct amparo proceedings brought by credit institutions: a new judicial criterion

Executive Summary:

Banks that file injunctions to halt the execution of a judgment could cease doing so at no cost. A recent ruling by a Collegiate Court of the First Circuit maintains that credit institutions must provide collateral to obtain a stay in an injunction. This ruling introduces a relevant element to a debate in which there are conflicting arguments and precedents, so its scope should be evaluated according to the circumstances of each case.

A company wins a judgment against a bank after years of litigation. The bank files for an injunction and requests a stay of execution. During this time—which the Supreme Court has estimated at about six months—the company does not receive payment. Who is responsible for the damages incurred during this delay? A new legal precedent offers a new answer.

What had been argued previously, and what does the new criterion propose?

Article 86 of the Law of Credit Institutions provides that while they are not in liquidation or in bankruptcy proceedings, members of the banking system are considered to have proven solvency and are not obliged to constitute deposits or bonds, "not even when it comes to obtaining the suspension of the acts claimed in the amparo trials."

Based on that provision, there are criteria and arguments according to which article 86 of the Law of Credit Institutions constitutes a special rule that exempts credit institutions from providing a guarantee to obtain the suspension.

However, on October 2, 2026, the Fifteenth Collegiate Court for Civil Matters of Mexico City, in resolving a series of complaints filed by financial entities, established the jurisprudence I.15o.C. J/1 C (12a.), with digital registration number 2032723, under the category: “SUSPENSION IN DIRECT AMPARO PROCEEDINGS. CREDIT INSTITUTIONS MUST PROVIDE A GUARANTEE TO RESPOND FOR ANY POSSIBLE DAMAGES THAT MAY BE CAUSED TO THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTY AS A RESULT OF GRANTING SUCH A GUARANTEE.”

The reasoning is based on the fact that the Constitution, in section X of article 107, and the Amparo Law, in its article 190, condition the suspension of civil and commercial proceedings on the plaintiff guaranteeing any damages that may be caused to the third party. Therefore, in the court's words, these provisions “cannot be subordinated to a rule contained in a different law.” Under the reasoning adopted by this Collegiate Court, article 86 of the Law of Credit Institutions would not, in itself, be sufficient to exempt credit institutions from providing a guarantee in such cases.

Furthermore, the court applies a pre-existing precedent, namely Supreme Court ruling P./J. 6/92, which obligates credit institutions to guarantee the suspension of injunctions in direct amparo proceedings. Although this precedent dates from the Eighth Judicial Era, the collegiate court considers that, since it does not conflict with the provisions of the new Amparo Law, it remains in effect. In any case, this is a ruling from a collegiate court, whose binding force has limits, and which could be subject to conflicting interpretations.

What does this mean in practice?

For counterparties of credit institutions. In those matters where this criterion is applicable, the third party interested may request that a sufficient guarantee be set or, where appropriate, challenge its omission or amount through the appropriate means of defense.

For credit institutions. The new criteria make it advisable to consider, when defining the suspension strategy in each case, the possibility that a guarantee may be required and, if so, to evaluate its cost against the benefit of maintaining the suspension of the execution. At the same time, legal arguments and criteria remain that can be invoked to support the application of the exemption provided for in Article 86 of the Law on Credit Institutions, so the strategy must be defined on a case-by-case basis.

The broader context: the courts after judicial reform.

This criterion is not isolated. In the Twelfth Era, which began with the new composition of the Judiciary following the recent judicial reform, some federal courts have applied the guarantee of suspension more rigorously: in 2026, it was ruled that even a declaration of bankruptcy does not exempt a private company from exhibiting it. Although a uniform position can still be considered, this opens the door to reviewing assumptions that were previously taken for granted.

The jurisprudence discussed here constitutes a relevant criterion within the debate on the requirements for granting a suspension and its interaction with special regimes provided for in other laws. However, its scope must be analyzed considering the rules on the binding nature of jurisprudence, the existence of differing criteria and arguments, and the possibility that the issue may be subject to a conflict of criteria or a subsequent ruling by the Supreme Court.

In this context, both credit institutions and their counterparties must consider this new criterion when defining their procedural strategy in direct appeals, bearing in mind that its application and concrete effects will depend on the circumstances of each case and the jurisdictional body that hears it.